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INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION AND COMPETITION 
IN AUTOMOBILE REPLACEMENT PARTS-BACK TO 
MONOPOLY PROFITS? 
James E Fitzpatrickt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The central confrontation in the current debate over the enactment of 
industrial design legislation I is between the auto manufacturers and the 
automobile insurance industry allied with the consumer movement. That 
intense disagreement is based, as often is the case in important legislative 
proposals, on an underlying, high-stakes economic battle. Quite simply, the 
auto manufacturers want to secure intellectual property protection for the 
manufacture and sale of automobile replacement parts and thereby raise 
parts prices back to the stratospheric levels which existed when auto compa-
nies enjoyed a de facto monopoly over parts manufacture and sale. 
Although the designs of these parts today are largely in the public domain, 
until recently, for solely practical reasons, no potential competitors used 
those designs in manufacturing competitive auto body parts; that has now 
changed dramatically. The insurance industry-the largest purchaser of 
body parts used to repair automobiles-wants to retain the current level of 
competition and promote future competition in the sale of these parts. This 
competition has driven prices sharply lower and thereby reduced the costs-of 
auto repair. Thus, this dispute, at its core, has little to do with intellectual 
property principles; it has much to do with the choice between monopoly 
and compet-ition. 
Intellectual property principles, however, weigh heavily in favor of the 
economic position of insurance companies and other consumers of replace-
ment parts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that patent 
law recognizes copying and imitation as an essential, positive element of a 
competitive economy. "From their inception, the federal patent laws have 
embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the 
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both neces-
sary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy ... 2 
The particular balance between protection and free imitation in the patent 
t A.B .. 1955. Indiana University; J.D .. 1959. Indiana University. Senior partner. Arnold 
& Porter. Washington. D.C. The author has been a Visiting Professor of Law at Trinity 
College. Dublin. and the London School of Economics. and an Adjunct Professor of Law 
at Georgetown University Law Center. Mr. Fitzpatrick is counsel to State Farm Insur-
ance Companies and is Coordinator of the Coalition for Competitive Repair Parts. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable research and editing assistance 
provided by his colleague at Arnold & Porter. Laurence J. Freedman. and Jennifer Blum. 
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I. Three virtually identical industrial design rights bills were introduced during the IOlst 
Congress: H.R. 902. 10Ist Cong .• 1st Sess. (1989). H.R. 3017. JOist Cong .. 1st Sess. 
(1989) and H.R. 3499. 10Ist Cong .. 1st Scss. (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 
81-138. 
2. Bonito Boats. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats. Inc .. 489 U.S. 141. 146 (1989). 
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laws "dependlsl almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the 
exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations.") This reflects "a con-
gressional understanding. implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free 
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal pat-
ent is the exception. ,,4 
The replacement parts dispute raises these fundamental questions con-
cerning the degree of protection most conducive to innovation and competi-
tion. It involves the competitive status of "crash parts" and "hard parts" for 
auto replacement and repair. Crash parts are metal, plastic and glass com-
ponents such as bumpers. fenders, hoods, door panels and windshields used 
in the repair of damaged automobiles . .5 Industry-wide, sheet metal and 
plastic parts are about an eight billion-dollar annual market; it is estimated 
that competitive crash parts account for approximately ten to thirteen per-
cent of that total market. b Until the early 1980s. though, this market was 
under a virtual monopoly of the auto manufacturers. For example, the only 
place a repair shop could get a new fender to replace a General Motors, Ford 
or Toyota fender was from a General Motors, Ford or Toyota dealer; like-
wise. the only fenders manufactured or marketed were made by the auto 
manufacturers. The one major exception to the crash parts monopoly was in 
the production of replacement glass-windshields and side windows-
which historically has been provided largely by aftermarket competitors, 
rather than the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).7 
The second category of auto replacement parts affected by the legisla-
tion is "hard parts"-spark plugs, oil filters, mufflers, shock absorbers, bat-
teries, and similar mechanical parts. This market has been largely compet-
itive for years. II A consumer generally can go to an auto service station to 
3. Id. at 151. 
4. Id. 
5. For a more complete definition of "crash parts:' refer to the FfC complaint in the Gen-
eral Motors crash parts distribution case. III re General Motors Corp., 99 F.T.C. 464.465 
(1982). 
6. AII/o IlIsl/re/llce Compal/ies BlItlle Restrictiolls 01/ Replacemellt PlIrts. The Detroit News, 
Jan. 4. 1989. § F. at 2. col. I I hereinafter Replc/('ement Partsl: see also C. BARFIELD & c. 
BELTZ. INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION AND AUTOMOBILE REPAIR PARTS: BALANCING 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY AT HOME AND ABROAD 6-7 (1990) thereinafter BARFIELD 
REPORTI· 
7. The IlIdl/strillllllllOl'Gtioll alld Techl/ology Act: Hearillgs Oil S. 791 BejiJre the SI/bcomm. 
Oil PlIIellt.l", Copyrights al/d Tr{ulemllrks of the Sellllfe Comm. Oil the Judicillry. tOOth 
.Cong .. 1st Sess. 162 (1987) thereinafter Sellllte Hellrillgsl (statement of Malcolm J. 
Romano. Patent Counsel. Lear Siegler, Inc.). The glass market provides a good model 
of healthy competition in the auto parts industry. OEMs choose to make their own orig-
inal glass. buy original glass from outside companies and/or compete in the aftermarket 
for replacement glass. Similarly. independent glass manufacturers choose to compete in 
the aftermarket and/or supply auto manufacturers. Id. 
8. See id. at 153-54 (statement of August Alegi, Vice President and Deputy General Coun-
sel of GEICO). William Crabtree. the Vice President and General Counsel of the Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) simply claims that the industrial design 
bills would not provide design protection for hard parts such as "spark plugs. carburet-
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have these parts replaced and choose among a variety of available competi-
tive "hard parts." 
The issue raised in the industrial design bills is whether these two vast 
markets-now infused with competition-will be transformed into a 
monopoly province for the auto manufacturers, leaving them "nearly unfet-
tered pricing discretion."') Obviously, the insurer and consumer stake is to 
retain competition in the manufacture, distribution and sale of these parts. 
The insurance industry argues, based on fundamental legal and eco-
nomic principles. that auto owners should have a right to repair vehicles with 
parts that must be and are virtually identical to OEM parts, that design pro-
tection for crash parts cannot and will not spur OEM design creativity, and 
that auto manufacturers should compete both in the market for new autos, 
where design costs are captured in the sale of the original car, and in the 
market for parts. 
The current debate over industrial design protection is the latest chap-
ter in a long history of conRicts between auto manufacturers and the auto 
insurance industry. most of which have focused largely on improving auto 
safety and requiring better built, more crash-resistant cars. For example, 
the insurance industry was a major private sector protagonist for passive 
restraint systems-airbags and automatic seat belts-safety efforts that 
were oppose" by the automobile companies until the mid-1980s. 10 Simi-
larly, the insurance industry has also pressed for the five-mile-per-hour 
bumper, a device which significantly lessens damage in low-speed crashes. II 
The current dispute over industrial design protection, however, takes 
this industry debate into a new and different forum. One cannot understand 
the broad dimensions of the confrontation over industrial design protection 
unless the full economic stakes are understood. 
II. THE ESSENTIALS OF THE ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION 
OVER AUTO CRASH PARTS 
From the insurance perspective, there are two major cost components 
which constitute the largest portion of an auto insurer's expenses-personal 
injury expenses and property damage expenses. The personal injury cost 
component has increased markedly, largely because of rapidly escalating 
medical and hospital costs and an out-of-control tort reparations system. 
ors. mufflers. landl glass." Id. at 83. However. the Register of Copyright does not 
agree: he believes the bills would cover hard parts. /d. at 240. Neither the sponsors of 
the bills nor the bills' language suggest that such parts are distinguishable from other car 
parts on any principled basis. 
9. Gelleral Motors. III re 99 F.T.c. at 584 (monopoly in crash parts distribution creates this 
power). 
10. The Supreme Court noted that the "automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent 
of war against the airbag." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mul. Auto. Ins. Co .. 
463 U.S. 29. 49 ( 1983). 
II. See Center for Auto Safety v. Peck. 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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Efforts to moderate tort damages, particularly within the justice system, have 
run into intransigent, and too often successful, opposition from trial law-
yers. Escalating medical costs present a difficult problem; in response, the 
insurance industry staunchly supports medical cost containment measures. 12 
Cost containment initiatives have been much more successful on the 
property damage side. Stronger bumpers have eliminated pesky, unneces-
sary damage from low-speed crashes. Many insurers have insisted on com-
petitive labor rates in auto repairs, and local conspiracies in setting labor 
repair rates have been challenged in antitrust suits. IJ Modern claims proce-
dures have helped minimize costs. Additionally, there are now significant 
cost savings resulting from competition in the supply of crash parts. 
For decades, notwithstanding the existence of the legal right of a 
potential competitor to manufacture crash parts, inasmuch as they were 
largely in the public domain and unprotected under existing design patent 
laws, in fact there was no competition in this country in crash parts due to 
economic and technical factors. Existing suppliers of crash parts who sub-
contracted with OEMs were concerned with not-so-subtle pressures to stay 
in the good graces of their OEM parts purchasers. Also, auto manufactur-
ers often retained the ownership of tools and dyes from which subcontrac-
tors produced sheet metal parts. For these and other reasons, the manufac-
ture, distribution and sale of crash parts remained under the sole control of 
the auto companies. In contrast, throughout that time period in th~ market 
for auto glass and hard parts. a flourishing competitive industry existed and 
the auto companies were fully acclimated to that marketplace reality. 
As a result of this monopoly. in the mid-1970s through the early 1980s 
crash parts prices skyrocketed. 14 In the early 1980s. though, crash parts 
competition emerged, largely from the Far East. This evolved from a vari-
ety of factors-new technology which permitted exact replication of the 
original product; greater styling overlaps among car models; artificially 
inHated prices; 15 and, finally, a will to compete where others had previously 
shunned competition. 
12. See gellere//~\' Affordability (md Amilability of AU{(Jmobile Illsure/llce: Hearillgs Before the 
Subcomm. Oil Commerce. COllsumer Protectioll. alld Compefliil'elless of the House Comm. 011 
Ellergy alld Commerce. IOOlh Cong .. 2d Sess. I 1-12 ( 1988) I hereinafter Automobile IllSlIr-
alice Hearillgs) (unpublished statement of CA. Ingham. General Counsel. Slate Farm 
Insurance Companies) (describing Slate Farm's efforts 10 reduce aUlo insurance COSIS). 
13. See. e.g .. Washinglon v. Frank & Sons Auto Body. No. C86-377-AAM (E.D. Wash. May 
18. 1989) (defendanl repair shops enlered into a consenl decree enjoining them from 
engaging in a variely of price-fixing activities with olher repair shops for a period of len 
years): Nalionwide Mul. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Servo Councils of Del.. Inc .. 1980-81 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63.689 (D. Del. 1980) (defendant repair shops enlered inlo a con-
sent decree enjoining Ihem from engaging in a varielY of price-fixing aClivities for a 
period of five years). 
14. See Senate Hearillgs. supra note 7. al97 (slalemenl of Jean C. Hiesland. Vice President 
and General Counsel. Slate Farm Mutual AUlOmobile Insurance Co.). 
15. See id. at 94-95 (siatemeni of Jean C. Hiesland. Vice President and General Counsel. 
Stale Farm Mutual AUiomobile Insurance Co .. nOling these three factors). 
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The economic benefits of competition were profound. Overall. the 
crash parts indices which had been measuring a steady increase in crash 
parts costs turned down. If> This reflected, of course, the fact that price 
competition had led to sharply lower prices for individual crash parts. For 
example. the price of an OEM 1983 Omni fender fell from $140 in 1983 to 
$76 in 1984-1986. A competitive aftermarket product was available in 
1986 for $67. Likewise. an OEM 1983 Aries fender cost $221 in 1983, 
$180 in 1984 (when competition was introduce(J) and $87 in 
1985-1986-less than half the original price. A competitive aftermarket 
product was available in 1986 for $79. 17 Similarly. an OEM 1980 Accord 
fender cost $151 in 1983 and $93 in 1989. In 1989, the competitive after-
market product cost $80. IX That experience with competition is replicated 
in part after part. In contrast. for crash parts for which there was no com-
petitive aftermarket product. the prices remained constant or even 
increased; for example. the OEM 1977 Caprice front door cpst $267 in 
1977. $487 in 1982. $630 in 1986 and $671 in 1987. I'J 
Consumers received added relief from inHated crash parts prices 
because auto manufacturers have reduced their prices on a nationwide basis 
once a competitive crash part has appeared in a local market, driving over-
all crash parts prices sharply downward. 20 To date, however. only a small 
fraction of the total number of crash parts are available on a competitive 
basis. Competing manufacturers have, naturally enough, turned first to 
high-volume parts which provide the most attractive competitive base, 
although over time more and more parts will be produced in the competitive 
aftermarket. 
Two new dynamics are now emerging. First, crash parts production is 
now expanding from traditional sheet metal parts into plastic parts. The 
major manufacturers of these parts are in the United States and Canada. 
Second. the United States' sheet metal crash parts manufacturing industry 
is, many expect, on the verge of rapid development. Although most major 
suppliers of sheet metal crash parts today are in Europe an.d Asia, industry 
observers who support crash parts competition hope that, over time, the 
dominant location for the manufacture of these parts will shift substantially 
to the United States. 21 Of course, passage of any of the proposed industrial 
design bills would make that domeslil: economic expansion impossible. 
The ultimate potential benefit of continuing, and expanding, price 
16. /C/. at 97. 
17. See MITOIELL'S MANUALS ON COLI.ISION ESTIMATING GUIDES and KEYSTONE CRASII 
PARTS DIGEST. 
18. /C/. 
19. Sellate HearillKJ. Jllpra note 7. at 96. 
20. See Alltomobile hl.l'lIrllllCe Hel/ri".~.f •. wpra note 12. at 12 (unpublished statement of C.A. 
Ingham) (describing slashing of manufacturers' crash parts prices once a competitive 
product penetrates even a small part of a particular parts market). 
21. See Sellllfe HellrillKJ. slipra note 7. at 167. 171-72 (statements of Jean C. Hiestand and 
James F. Fitzpatrick). 
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competition in crash parts is immense. It offers a major opportunity for 
insurers and consumers to help keep insurance costs down. Literally hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in automobile repair costs are at stakeY Auto-
mobile manufacturers. understandably. are anxious to reestablish their 
monopoly control over the crash parts market. 23 This monopoly control 
would directly benefit. in the form of supernormal monopoly profits, for-
eign as well as domestic auto manufacturers. Additionally, the increasingly 
complex structure of the United States automobile market will further boost 
the net economic benefits to foreign interests. For example. General Motors 
has equity arrangements. marketing arrangements. distribution arrange-
ments. joint ventures. supply contracts. technology arrangements. and man-
ufacturing arrangements with major foreign companies. such as Isuzu. 
Toyota. Nissan. Volvo. and Daewoo. As noted. this issue is powered largely 
by economics. not by intellectual property principles. 
III. RECURRING ISSUES IN THE CRASH PARTS DEBATE: RED 
HERRINGS CREATED BY THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
In attempting to regain their monopoly status through initiatives at the 
state and federal level. in the courts and legislatures. the auto companies 
have raised the following fundamental questions. none of which. for the rea-
sons stated below. provides a basis to create design protection for crash 
parts: counterfeiting. safety. and quality. 
A. Is This a Question of "Palming Off' Competitive Crash Parts? 
Misrepresentati~n as to the source of crash parts is not a problem 
because such parts normally come in their own distinctive wrapping and 
boxes. Some of these parts also bear a distinctive imprint showing the 
manufacturer. Additionally, the parts are ordered. received and installed 
by repair shops; these repairers have knowledge of the source of the parts 
and understand exactly when they are using competitive parts. Thus. it 
seems unlikely that any question of palming off will occur from the repair 
shops' perspective. 
22. Industrial DesiKn Legislatioll: Hearing~ 011 H.R. 902. H.R. 3017. H.R. 3499 Before the 
SlIbcomm. all COllrtS. Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Cumm. all the Judiciary. 10Ist Cong .. 2d Sess. (1990) Ihereinafter JUlie 1990 House 
HearinKsl ('-1npublished statement of CA. Ingham. General Counsel. State Farm Insur-
ance Companies). Because of the enormous size of the market in crash parts. the sav-
ings provided even with a little competition is dramatic. Direct savings alone-in other 
words. those savings attributable solely to the purchase of competitive rather than auto 
makers' parts-is almost $400 millioll {/nnll{//~\'. This figurc does not include additional 
savings that result from the decreases in the prices of the auto makers' parts due to com-
petition. And. it is a savings that has occurred when competitive parts have penetrated 
only roughly 13% of the market. Thus. the long-term potential price savings from this 
competition reaches billions of dollars. Id. at 7. 
23. See Replacemellls Parts. supra note 6. at 2 ("The big auto makers-such as General 
Motors. Ford. Chrysler. Toyota and Nissan-havc fought the rival parts industry since it 
began nibbling away at their monopoly on replacement parts. "). 
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A consumer's knowledge that competitive crash parts are being used is 
a separate issue. That matter can be adequately resolved by consumer infor-
mation legislation at the state level which requires that the consumer be 
informed of the use of competitive crash parts, legislation which the insur-
ance industry supports. 24 To the extent that palming off issues arise, how-
ever, existing laws are perfectly adequate to deal with such matters and 
should. of course, be vigorously enforced. 
B. Do Competitive Crash Parts Fail to Meet Federal Safety Standards?' 
Automobile manufacturers have raised concerns over whether competi-
tive crash parts are safe. 25 Those concerns are unfounded, as has been 
made abundantly clear by the' widely respected Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety: 
The source of the cosmetic parts used to repair cars has little to do 
with the possibility of injury in these cars after they have been 
repaired. With but one exception (lamps. reflective devices, and 
associated equipment I, there are no federal standards for replace-
ment parts because (there isl no reason to believe-let alone 
assume-that such parts significantly influence car crashwor-
thiness. u, 
Brian O'Neill, the President of the Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety, recently stated that auto manufacturers know quite well it has been 
proved that there is no safety problem with crash parts. 27 For example, an 
aftermarket hood was used in a recent thirty-mile-per-hour test crash. 
O'Neill noted that "lilt buckled exactly the way it should have" because 
"buckle points designed into manufacturer's hoods are also designed into 
the copies. ,,21S 
C. Are Aftermarket Parts of Comparable Quality? 
As in any product market, quality may vary somewhat from manufac-
turer to manufacturer. No doubt some competitive crash parts are lower in 
quality than the manufacturer's original parts. 2'1 But many competitive 
crash parts are of a quality comparable to OEM parts and some are even 
24. See illfra text accompanying notes 62-70. 
25. See Sellate Hearin!(s. supra note 7. at 78-79. 
26. Cosmetic Replacemell1 Parts anef Auto Repair Practice.~. Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety. Advisory I (Jan. 1987); Smate Hearill!(s. supra note 7. at 105; see also id. at 
106-17. 
27. Parts Isn't Parts. Californian (Bakersfield). Dec. 5. 1988. at CI. 
28. Id. 
29. See Senate Hearill!(S. supra note 7. at 70-72 (testimuny of Gary Newtson. Chief Patent 
Counsel. Chrysler Motor Corp .. representing the MVMA). The insurance industry 
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better than original parts. 30 Significantly, major United States auto compa-
nies often use the same foreign manufacturers as subcontractors to supply 
OEM parts that they are now attacking for supplying aftermarket parts. For 
example. Ford Motor Company has given its highest quality award to Lio 
Ho, a Taiwanese company which is also a major aftermarket supplier. 31 
The quality issue is one that should continue to be resolved in the 
marketplace or through consumer information legislation. Ralph Oman, 
Register of Copyrights, commenting on the crash parts debate in the context 
of industrial design legislation, has emphatically asserted that issues of 
quality have no proper place in the congressional determination whether to 
enact new design protection laws. 32 He said that "product reliability con-
cerns could be addressed in consumer products legislation rather than 
design legislation. Design protection gives a manufacturer a right to 
exclude all competing copies-superior parts as well as inferior ones."33 
To deal with quality assurance questions, insurers have joined with 
body shops, consumer groups and aftermarket parts distributors to form a 
nonprofit organization-the Certified Automotive Parts Association 
(CAPA)-to establish. with the assistance of an acknowledged expert test-
ing company in the field, appropriate quality standards for crash parts and 
to test parts against those standards. 34 Currently, CAPA has certified over 
1,000 parts from seventeen manufacturers. including three manufacturers 
rejects the assertion that there are widespread problems with finding quality parts and 
supports industry-wide quality testing. Specifically. the MVMA complains loudly 
about the quality of non-OEM sheet metal parts. /d. However. as GEICO points out. 
Keystone Automobile Industries. a large supplier of non-OEM parts. gua'rantees its sheet 
metal parts for as long as the purchaser owns the car. Id. at 155. 
30. See id. at 93-94. 132-34. At the Senate Hearings. the MVMA presented results of a 
comparison between a Chrysler-made replacement fender and two aftermarket fenders 
sold as replacements for the same original Chrysler fender. The Chrysler fender was 
superior. Id. at 77. During the same hearings. however. State Farm presented a compar-
ison of a Chrysler-made fender and an aftermarket fender made by another non-OEM. 
[d. at 93. The aftermarket fender was superior. Further. unlike the auto companies. the 
insurance companies support quality standards that would apply to both OEM and non-
OEM parts. [d. at 93-94. 
31. 7 COLLISION PARTS J. 22 (Spring 1988). 
32. Senate Hearings. supra note 7. at 241 (testimony of Ralph Oman. Register of Copy-
rights). The Register clearly rejects the Industrial Design Coalition's quality-based 
rationale for crash parts design protection. 
33. Id. That Coalition urges passage of design protection legislation so that "Iilnferior 
copies of original sheet metal will not be forced upon customers having their cars 
repaired." Id. at 59. 241. 
34. JUlie 1990 House Hearings. supra note 22. at 21-22 (unpublished statement of CA. 
Ingham): see also Parts Isn't Parts, supra note 27. at CI (discussing formation of CAPA 
in 1987 and extent of CAPA's activity to date). The auto manufacturers in 1987 stated 
that they knew of no existing system in the insurance industry or by aftermarket suppli-
ers to assure quality. Sellate Hearillgs. supra note 7. at 82. Clearly. auto manufacturers 
are now well aware of CAPA's rigorous and successful testing and certilication program. 
Auto manufacturers. as one might expect. would support such a group in order to main-
tain customer satisfaction. guarantee parts quali~y. and prevent palming orr. all of which 
they suggest are problems. 
1989] Industria"1 Design and Automobile Replacement Parts 241 
in the United States (and one in Canada).J5 CAPA's rigorous certification 
procedures include initial and periodic on-site inspections of manufacturing 
plants by Detroit Testing Laboratory (an independent testing laboratory), 
and comprehensive form, fit, metallurgical and corrosion tests. Jb This pro-
gram will help assure auto repairers. insurers and consumers of the quality 
of the competitive crash parts. 
IV. AUTO MANUFACTURERS HAVE DECLARED WAR ON AFfER-
MARKET COMPETITION AND HAVE MOBILIZED ON MANY 
FRONTS. INCLUDING INDUSTRIAL DESIGN LEGISLATION 
In an effort to eliminate aftermarket crash parts competition. the auto 
manufacturers have undertaken a wide variety of initiatives: bringing 
design patent suits, attempting to use state mold laws to halt competition. 
using federal trademark reform legislation to limit aftermarket advertising, 
supporting the passage of onerous laws at the state level which would cripple 
aftermarket competition. and pressing for industrial design protection. All 
those efforts to date have proved fruitless. as discussed below. 
One other initiative, which contributes to competition. is a vigorous. 
well-financed advertising campaign by auto manufacturers on radio, televi-
sion. and in magazines and newspapers addressing the comparative quality 
of OEM and aftermarket parts. 37 This certainly is the appropriate forum in 
which the competitive issues should be debated and resolved; the market-
place. not the legislatures or the courts. will maximize consumer benefit 
from aftermarket competition. 311 
35. CAPA. DIRECTORY OF CERTIFIED AfTERMARKET BODY PARTS (July 1990). 
36. [d. 
37. Competition also occurs between OEMs and manufacturers of hard parts. See. e.g .• 
TIME. Jan. 16. 1989. at 66-67 (Ford advertisement stating that "Quality Care ... lis) 
also Ford Motorcraft replacement parts. like filters. batteries. oil and spark plugs."). 
38. Recently. the staff of the FTC Los Angeles Regional Office and the Bureau of Economics 
evaluated carefully the role of the marketplace in promoting fair crash parts competi-
tion. Letter from Marcy J.K. Tiffany. Director. FTC Los Angeles Regional Office. to 
Representative John L. O·Brien. Speaker Pro Tempore. House of Representatives. State 
of Washington (Feb. 26. 1990). In this letter. the FTC staff noted that General Motors 
and Ford are aggressively promoting their body parts. id. at 5 n.lO. and an association of 
non-OEM parts suppliers (ABPA) is strongly recommending five-year limited warranties 
and has developed a rigorous certification program (CAPA). [d. at 6. With these and 
other market-driven private mechanisms for transmitting information. the FTC staff 
questioned the need for statutorily imposed disclosures. which. as they recognized. 
carry significant consumer costs that are greater than anticipated benefits. [d. at 5. 
Similarly. the staffs of the FTC Cleveland and Los Angeles Regional Offices evaluated a 
proposed Ohio disclosure bill. Letter from Mark D. Kindt. Director. FTC Cleveland 
Regional Office. and Marcy J.K. Tiffany. Director. FTC Los Angeles Regional Office. to 
Representative Joseph E. Haines. Ohio House of Representatives (Dec. 18. 1989). In 
this earlier letter. the FTC staff concluded that the disclosure bill "might substantially 
reduce compctition" and "might unreasonably restrict consumer choice in the market for 
auto crash parts." [d. at I. I o. The FTC staff strangely encouraged Ohio lawmakers to 
balance the costs of mandated disclosure against the "pcrceived benefits from it." [d. at 
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A. Design Patent Suits 
One way for the auto manufacturers to try to regain their monopoly sta-
tus is to take advantage of existing provisions in the federal patent laws relat-
ing to the protection of designs. 39 A number of automobile companies have 
sought and secured design patent rights on individual auto parts. For exam-
ple, Volvo has design patent rights on the front fenders of their familiar 
square back design. 40 
Other automobile manufacturers actively pursue design patents for dis-
tinctive automobile parts. For example, since 1972. over one hundred 
design patents for automobile parts-hoods, deflectors, fenders-and 
whole vehicle bodies were· issued or assigned to major automobile manufac-
turers. including Chrysler. G.M.C., Ford. Daimler-Benz .. Porsche, Saab, 
Volvo, Fiat. Alfa Romeo, Toyota. Nissan, and Honda. 
Volvo apparently has been the most vigorous OEM in attempting to 
enforce its design patents. Over the years, a number of distributors of com-
petitive crash parts. under enormous pressure from Volvo, have entered into 
uncontested consent decrees with Volvo stating that they would no longer 
sell aftermarket Volvo crash parts.41. There have. been only two litigated 
cases to date. In one case, Volvo sued Keystone Automotive Industries. a 
major California distributor of competitive automobile replacement parts. 
charging that Keystone's sale of competitive aftermarket fenders violated 
Volvo's design patent. 42 Keystone responded by challenging the validity of 
the Volvo patent, raising fundamental design patent issues-whether the 
Volvo fender was in fact a novel design or whether it had been anticipated by 
dozens of similarly shaped fenders, all of which existed in the prior art. 
Further, there was the critical legal question whethe'r the shape and design 
of the Volvo fender were predominantly dictated by functional concerns-
aerodynamics, crashworthiness, safety, corrosion resistance, and other 
aspects of performance-rather than prompted by matters of ornamentation 
I. See FTC Assails AI/to Parts Bill: Supports Insllrers. COlisumer.I'. Journal of Com-
merce. Dec. 29. 1989. 
39. Under existing design patent law. "lwlhoever invents any new. original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor. subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988). 
40. Volvo Des. Pat. 276.332 (front fender panel with angle of headlight assembly scoop 
modified from previous fender design) (filed Oct. 20. 1980) (granted Nov. 13. 1984); 
Volvo Des. Pat. 240.914 (Volvo 262C front fender) (tiled Dec. 20. 1974) (granted Aug. 
10. 1976); see also Volvo Des. P-dt. 280.399 (bumper extension) Oiled June 30. 1982) 
(granted Sept. 3. 1985); Rengle Nationale des Usines Renault. Des. Pat. 246.708 (car 
front fender pane\) <filed July 21. 1975) (granted Dec. 20. 1977). 
41. See. e.g .. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Auto King. M-86-734 (D. Md. filed Mar. 6. 1986) (joint 
motion for injunction by consent granted and judgment filed Dec. 5. 1986); Volvo N. 
Am. Corp. v. Alternative Automotive. Inc .. Civ. No. 84-0120-T (D. Mass. filed Jan. 17. 
1984) (joint motion for injunction granted and judgment tiled May 7. 1984). 
42. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Indus .. Inc .. CV86-8306 CBM (GX) (com-
plaint filed Dec. 19. 1986)( Volvo claimed infringement of Des. P-dt. 240.914). 
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and aesthetics. If the design was predominantly influenced by functional 
considerations. then the design patent is invalid.43 
After extensive discovery, Volvo decided to drop its case. It voluntar-
ily dismissed its complaint with prejudice.44 "ITlhe dismissal of the case 
by Volvo, together with its promise not to sue Keystone ... is a clear 
admission by Volvo that the 12401 patent is unenforceable."45 Although 
Volvo has said that it would continue to exercise its patent privileges and 
enforce its patents vigorously,46 it has not, to the author's knowledge. initi-
ated additional design patent suits. 
In a similar case, Chrysler recently charged that a manufacturer and a 
distributor of competitive replacement parts infringed the design patent on a 
Chrysler Dodge Dakota truck fender. 47 Chrysler moved for a preliminary 
injunction in federal district court to prevent further manufacture and sale 
of the competitive replacement truck fender. The district court denied 
Chrysler's preliminary injunction motion on the following rationale. 
Defendants challenged the validity of Chrysler's 299,019 design pat-
ent. Thus. the central question was whether the fender design was new, 
original, nonobvious, and ornamental, as required by the design patent law, 
or whether it was an "obvious" design or predominantly dictated by func-
tional considerations, with the consequence that the design patent would be 
invalid. 
The court determined, based on an affidavit of a defendant's expert 
witness. that the fender design was an "obvious combination of previous 
well-known design features."41! In denying a preliminary injunction. the 
court also concluded that the fender appeared to be "designed according to 
functional and performance considerations as opposed to aesthetic or orna-
mental considerations.,,4'l The court held that Chrysler had not shown a rea-
43. See Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics. Inc .. 806 F.2d 234. 238-39 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(preliminary injunction against alleged infringer vacated due to the primarily functional 
purpose of each feature of the patented article). The requirement that a design patent 
may be granted only for primarily ornamental designs derives from 3S U.S.c. § 171 
(1988). which requires that a patent is obtainable for a "new. original and ornamental" 
design. See a/so /11 re Carleui. 328 F.2d 1020. 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (affirming the 
refusal of a patent on grounds that design was functiollal and not ornamental in that it 
"was not created for the purpose of ornamenting"). 
44. See Joint Press Release of Volvo North America Corp. and Keystone Automotive Indus-
tries. Apr. 19. 1988. 
45. See Keystone Press Release. Apr. 21. 1988. 
46. See Barnes. Vo/m Drops PllIellf Suit VII Auto Parts. National Underwriter. May 2. 1988. at 
1.42. 
47. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio. 719 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1989) 
(order denying preliminary injunction) (Chrysler claimed infringement of Des. POd!. 
299.019). afrd. 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
48. Chrysler. 719 F. Supp. at 624. 
49. 1cI. Of note on the question of functionality is Chrysler's advertising claim with respect 
to its Dodge Dakota pickup. This advertising confirms that Chrysler products. in partic-
ular the Dakota parts. embody overall designs dictated primarily by functional consider-
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sonable likelihood of success on the merits because "there is a serious ques-
tion as to the validity of the Chrysler (fender( patent in that the Chrysler 
fender is not 'a new, original and ornamental design.' ,,50 
The court also examined whether irreparable harm would result to 
Chrysler if a preliminary injunction were not granted. The court concluded 
that Chrysler's design patent was "probably invalid," that the issue of 
respective quality of the two fenders was contested, and that the packaging 
of the competitive fender minimized any possible confusion. 5t Thus, the 
court decided that Chrysler had not established the irreparable harm by rea-
son of alleged infringement and that the balance of equities and the public 
interest favored Auto Body Parts of Ohio and its codefendant. This decision 
was recently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 52 The court held that Chrysler failed to satisfy the "likelihood of 
success" and "irreparable injury" requirements for obtaining a preliminary 
injunction. 53 The case on the merits of Chrysler's claim is still pending 
before the district court. 
Volvo and Chrysler's inability to enforce existing design patents to date 
does not, of course, prove the need for Congress to create a new, expanded 
design right. Rather, it demonstrates only that auto manufacturers, seeking 
to protect ordinary crash parts, often cannot satisfy well-established design 
patent statutory standards of novelty, nonobviousness and nonfunctionality. 
These established standards in the design patent law represent the 
proper societal balance between enhancing creativity and fostering competi-
tion. Certainly one can obtain a design patent and win an infringement 
suit. 54 Only a handful of the 5,000 or so design patents granted annually 
end up in court. Admittedly, two-thirds of those patents which were subject 
to judicial challenge did not pass muster once a court examined whether 
they met design patent standards,55 but half of the utility patents subject to 
judicial challenge do not survive either, and no one is claiming that the 
established standards for mechanical patents should be relaxed simply 
because courts reject half of those patents. 56 , 
ations. not aesthetic concerns. "Dodge built Dakota through experience. In the lield. 
we learned what to build." Trucks 1989: Midsize Dako/(/. at 8. 
50. Chrysler, 719 E Supp. at 625. 
51. Id. 
52. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio. 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
53. Id. at 953-54. 
54. Perry Said man. a fellow participant in this conference. has noted the broadened opportu-
nities for design protection afforded by the Ada case. See Avia Group Int'I. Inc. v. L.A. 
Gear Cal.. Inc .. 853 E2d 1557. 1562-66 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
55. Protec'tiull uf Illdl/strial Desiglls uf Usejid Articles: Hearillg.~ Oil H.R. 1179 8ejilre the 
SI/bcomm. UII Courts. Cil'iJ Liberties alld the Administratioll oIJI/,I'tice of the HOl/se Comm. 
on the JI/diciary. 100th Cong .. 2d Sess. 156-57 (1988) (hereinafter 1988 HOItse Hearillgs( 
(testimony of Prof. Ralph Brown. Professor of Law. Emeritus. Yale Law School). 
56. /d. 
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B. Slale Mold Laws 
A second area that auto companies have addressed in their attempts to 
kill off aftermarket competition is the protection afforded by state mold 
laws. A number of states have declared that it is unfair competition to use 
an original part in making a "plug" or "pattern" from which copies are 
made. Many of these statutes prohibit only the copying of boat hulls-ap-
parently. boat manufacturers in a number of states were particularly stung 
by competition and were able to get anticopying statutes enacted. These 
state statutes attempt to preclude the creation of a "plug" mold, made from 
an OEM part. into which fiberglass or other material would be injected to 
make replica parts. 57 Other state mold statutes go further and prohibit the 
use of an OEM part as a "pattern" in making copies; they a~ply broadly, and 
arguably crash parts could be included within their scope.' II . 
Ford Motor Company charged. inter alia. that Keystone violated these 
state mold laws in Keystone's distribution of competitive Ford crash parts. 59 
Among other defenses. Keystone asserted that state mold laws have been 
preempted by federal patent law under the doctrines announced in the 
Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Slifjel Co. 60 and Compeo Corp. v. Day-Brile Lighl-
ing. Inc. bl decisions. 
That issue has now been definitively resolved in the recent Supreme 
Court case of Bonilo Boals. Inc. v. Thunder Craft BoalS. Inc. 62 The Court 
held unanimously, in a decision written by Justice O·Connor. that state mold 
laws create patent-like protections in an area where the federal government 
has legislated comprehensively and thereby have been preempted by the fed-
eral patent laws. 63 Thus. based on Bonito Boats. Ford's challenge to after-
market competition based on state mold laws was dismissed with prejudice 
on federal preemption grounds. M The auto manufacturers cannot look to 
these state laws to frustrate aftermarket competition. 
57. See. e.g .. Bonito Boals. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc .. 489 U.S. 141. 144-45. 163-64 
(1989) (discussing antimold statute and mold procedure). 
58. Twelve states have enacted "mold statutes" granting the original manufacturers of vari-
ous products the right to prohibit others from copying the products by use of a "direct 
molding process" and/or selling such copies without the original manufacturer's con-
sent. Although most of these stalutes apply only to boat hulls and component parts. the 
statutes of three states-California. Michigan. and Tennessee-purportedly prohibit 
the use of a direci molding process to duplicate {lny manufactured item for commercial 
purposes. CAL. Bus. & PRO!; CODE § 17300 (West 1987): MICIl. COMP. LAWS § 445.622 
(1988): TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-III(a) (1988). 
59. Ford Motor Co. v. Keystone Auto. Indus .. Inc .. No. 87-CV-1900-DT Civ. (filed E.D. 
Mich. 1987) (Ford claimed that Keystone's manufacture and sale of competitive crash 
parts violated the "direct molding process aCls of Ihe several Slates."). 
60. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
61. 376 U.S. 234 ( 1964). 
62. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
63. /d. at 168. 
64. Ford Motor Co. v. Keystone Auto. Indus .. Inc .. No. 87-CV-1900-DT Civ. (filed E.D. 
Mich. 1987) (mold claim dismissed July 5, 1989). 
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C. Federal Trademark Reform 
An additional sally in the aftermarket battle took place in connection 
with amendments to the Lanham Act considered and enacted by the Con-
gress in 1988. As introduced, the proposed amendments would have added 
language to the Lanham Act that extended existing prohibitions against 
making affirmative misrepresentations to a new situation-the omission of 
material facts. That proposed amendment was suppor.ted by vehicle manu-
facturers. It raised the specter that an amended Lanham Act would provide 
a basis for auto manufacturers to charge that aftermarket competitors had 
"omitted" some relevant fact in connection with advertising their competi-
tive parts. Using this proposal. a manufacturer might charge that the omis-
sion of the country of origin might have been material. or that failure to say 
it was produced under standards that allegedly differed from the OEM's 
standards, or failure to say that the warranty terms might have been differ-
ent were material omissions. After insurance interests joined other compa-
nies in noting their vi'gorous concerns with this proposed omissions lan-
guage, it was dropped from the final text of the law. 
D. State Consumer Protection Laws 
As the Register of Copyrights has indicated, the debate over the com-
parative quality of competitive and OEM parts is properly a matter for con-
sumer information legislation. not for intellectual property law. Heated 
debate over appropriate consumer protection legislation has taken place in 
the various state legislatures. In the course of this debate, the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has released a draft model 
consumer protection regulation.65 This regulation is directed to "prompt, 
fair and equitable [insurance I settlements" with regard to the use of after-
market parts. 66 The NAIC model bill has an identification clause, disclo-
sure component and a quality component. It requires that an insurer dis-
close to the insurance claimant either on its repair estimate or on a separate 
document that "THIS ESTIMATE HAS BEEN PREPARED BASED ON THE 
USE OF AUTOMOBILE PARTS NOT MADE BY THE ORIGINAL MANUFAC-
TURER."67 Some insurers, such as State Farm Insurance Companies. are 
doing this as standard practice even without legislation. 611 Further, the req-
uisite disclosure under the NAIC model bill must also reflect that aftermar-
ket parts are "at least equal in like. kind. and quality to the original part in 
terms of fit, quality and performance.,,6'l The insurance industry has in the 
65. See Sellate Hearillgs. supra note 7. at 141-42 (NAIC Aftermarket P-Jrts Model Regula-
lion. Apr. 14. 1987). 
66. Id. al 141. 
67. lei. at 142 (emphasis added). 
68. See id. al 132. 147 (every State Farm appraisal specifies if a non-OEM component is to 
be used). Similarly. GEICO discloses on every computer-generated estimate that the 
estimate may include non-OEM aftermarkel parts. Id. at 155. 161. 
69. Id. al 142. 
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past supported the NAIC model bill in those states where it became a legis-
lative issue. On the other hand. the aftermarket industry and insurers-
and most recently. in two instances, the FTC staff-strongly opposed the 
form of disclosure pressed by the auto manufacturers. which used language 
so inflammatory and extreme as to effectively direct consumers away from 
competitive aftermarket parts, rather than simply disclose their use in the 
repair process. 70 For example. several states have enacted legislation 
requiring, in addition to the NAIC-type clauses, that the auto owner grant 
special and prior consent to the installation of competitive alternative parts. 
This state-by-state debate has been described as a "slugfest between 
insurance companies and automobile manufacturers."71 In 1988, six states 
added consumer information statutes.72 and it appears that twenty-one 
states. as of mid-1989. had laws or regulations applicable to insurers or 
repair shops concerning the use of competitive auto parts. While debate 
between OEMs and insurance companies continued in 1989 at the state 
level. there are indications that the auto manufacturers and the insurance 
industry have reached a mutually acceptable compromise solution. Com-
promise legislation. first passed in Tennessee in 1988. was enacted in 1989 
in Alabama. Georgia. Florida. Colorado. and Missouri and is pending in 
several other states. The Tennessee language has become the state legisla-
tive model for both OEMs and insurance companies. 
In the interim. state officials have cautioned Congress not to intervene 
with industrial design legislation which would cripple the new crash parts 
competition. The President of NAIC has said that "[a)n absence of price 
competition in [the crash parts) market would result in attendant price 
increases for automobile repairs which can only put greater pressure on 
insurers and commissioners to deal with the problems of additional rate 
increases for automobile insurance.'073 
E. Marketplace Competition 
One additional area in which the crash parts confrontation is taking 
place is in the domestic marketplace-certainly the appropriate forum for 
70. See Replacemellf ParIs. supra note 6, at 2 (MVMA and Aftermarket Body Parts Associa-
tion statements concerning proposed state consumer notification laws). Recently the 
fTC staff issued a letter and press release seriously questioning the need for the pro-
posed Washington State disclosure law. fTC Press Release. Mar. 13. 1990: Letter from 
fTC to Representative O·Brien. Washington House of Representatives (Feb. 26. 1990). 
The fTC staff also recently issued 10 pages of detailed comments and a two-page press 
release opposing a proposed Ohio disclosure bill on the ground that "some of the biJrs 
provisions might injure consumer welfare by substantially reducing competition and 
consumer choice in the market for crash parts." fTC Press Release. Dec. 27. 1989: let-
ter from fTC to Representative Haines. Ohio House of Representatives (Dec. 18. 1989). 
71. Replacemem Part.\·, !illpm note 6. at 2. 
72. [d. 
73. See SellC"e HearillKS. sl/pra note 7. at 131 (letter from Edward Muhl. President. NAIC. to 
Sen. DeConcini). 
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the public to sort through questions of quality, price and competition. Con-
sumers see television advertisements by E.G. Marshall urging them to be 
sure that only "genuine GM parts" are used in the repair of their cars. On 
the other hand, insurance companies publish brochures indicating the 
significant cost savings from crash parts competition and their intent to use 
only quality competitive parts in auto repair. This advertising debate, part 
of an open and free commercial battle aimed at the minds and the pocket-
books of American consumers and repair shops, is the appropriate way to 
determine the future of the crash parts industry-rather than by legislative 
or judicial fiat destroying the competitive market. 74 
Rather than relying on the marketplace, the auto manufacturers' final 
attemp!-possibly its most serious threat-to eliminate aftermarket com-
petition is to ask Congress to destroy it through the industrial design bill. 
That issue is considered in Part V, below. 
F. British Experience with Crash Parts: British Leyland and the 1988 Act 
It should be noted that the debate over the appropriate role of crash 
parts also extends abroad .. In Great Britain, the House of Lords in the case 
of British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., determined that car 
owners have "an inherent right to repair their cars in the most economical 
way possible and for that purpose to have access to a free market in spare 
parts. ,,75 That case involved a suit by an auto manufacturer that owned the 
design copyright to an automobile exhaust pipe; the auto company sued to 
enjoin the manufacturer of a competitive exhaust pipe. Notwithstanding the 
existence of a copyright in the exhaust pipe under British intellectual prop-
erty laws, the House of Lords held that the consumer's right to repair his car 
must prevail over the auto manufacturer's copyright interest.76 
British Leyland held that auto manufacturers are "not entitled to dero-
gate from or interfere with [a consumer's right to repair] by asserting their 
copyright ... against a person manufacturing parts solely for repair."" 
Lord Bridge framed the issue this way: "What the [auto] owner needs, ifhis 
right to repair is to be of value to him, is the freedom to acquire a previously 
74. Claims that aftermarket competitors are unscrupulous, immoral, free-riders, or pirates 
are unjustified. Copying an unpatented product is perfectly appropriate. As the 
Supreme Court said in Bonito Boats. "[a)ppending the conclusionary label 'unscrupu-
lous' to such competitive behavior merely endorses a policy judgment which the patent 
laws do not leave the States free to make. Where an item in general circulation is unpro-
tected by patent, '[r)eproduction of a functional attribute is legitimate competitive activ-
ity.'" Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989) (quoting 
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,863 (1982) (White, J., concurring in 
result». 
75. 1 App. Cas. 577, 578 (H.L. 1986). My fellow participant in this conference, Christine 
Fellner, provides a provocative discussion of British Leyland. See Fellner, The New 
United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19 U. BALl: L. REv. 369 (1989). 
76. British Leyklnd. 1 App. Cas. at 578. 
77. [d. 
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manufactured replacement exhaust system in an unrestricted market.'t78 
And he held that a consumer's right to repair his car must prevail over the 
automobile manufacturer's copyright interest. Auto manufacturers have 
'~Iready enjoyed the primary benefit which their copyright protects" in the 
original sale of the car. To enforce auto manufacturers' copyrights and to 
thereby maintain their monopolies in the supply of repair parts is "to detract 
from the [car] owner's rights and, at least potentially, the value of their 
cars.,,79 
The consumer's "right to repair" issue was carried forward into the 
debate in Parliament over the recently promulgated Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act of 1988.80 That Act creates a new unregistered design right in 
the shape or configuration of any article, including a purely functional, 
three-dimensional article. Two important exceptions in the law substan-
tially curtail its application to aftermarket crash parts, however. 
First, section 213(3)(b)(i) provides a "must-fit" exception; a design right 
does not subsist in a design configuration which "enables the article to be con-
nected to, or placed in, around or against, another article so that either article 
may perform its function." This applies only to those specific design features 
of a fender or hood that permit it to fit with the adjacent parts of the car.81 
Second, section 213(3)(b)(ii) is a key "must-match" exception. 
The new British design right does not extend to design features which are 
"dependent upon appearance of another article of which the article is 
intended by the designer to form an integral part." This exception would 
exclude the design features of a fender or hOOd because it has been created as 
an integral part of the overall auto design. Together, these exceptions, which 
apparently were generated by the crash parts debate and British Leyland, 
make clear that very few crash parts, if any, will qualify for protection under 
the new British law, because they are excluded by the must-match exceptions. 82 
78. [d. at 625. 
79. [d. at 627. 
80. It is not clear how much of British Leyland survives under the 1988 Act. It is widely 
thought that British Leyland presents one of many copyright and design patent issues that 
the British government subsequently addressed in studies and the 1988 Act. Christine 
Fellner discusses this in detail. See Fellner. supra note 75. 
81. H.R. 3017, IOlst Cong .• 1st Sess. (1989). one of the thrcc industrial design rights bills 
recently considered by the House. contained a narrow "must-fit" exception. However, 
this exception applied to only those design elements necessary to permit mechanical 
interface with surrounding parts. such as the design of bolt-hole patterns or flanges. 
Thus. because replacement parts must be identical in appearance to original parts. this 
exception was virtually worthless as a commercial matter. 
82. There is no legislative history of the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act of 1988 to 
confirm the coverage and intent of the "must-fit" and "must-match" provisions of section 
213. However. it is uniformly understood that these provisions were crafted to address the 
spare parts problem. See Horton. Designs. Shapes and Colours: A Comparison of Trade 
Mark Law in the United Kingdom and the United States. 9 EIPR 311.311 n.2 (l989)("[tJo 
prevent any monopoly in spare parts arising. if the design of features of an object is dic-
tated by the function the object is to perform. to make it able to fit with or match another 
article as part of an overall design. then those features will not be protected"). 
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V. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE OVER INDUSTRIAL 
DESIGN PRafECTION 
The most recent threat to the continued viability of aftermarket crash 
parts competition came from three virtually identical industrial design 
copyright bills, recently introduced in the 10Ist Congress: H.R. 902 intro-
duced by Representative Moorhead, H.R. 3017 introduced by Representa-
tive Gephardt and H.R. 3499 introduced by Representatives Moorhead and 
Kastenmeier by request of the Administration. 83 As drafted, their terms 
almost certainly would have extended to virtually all crash parts. 84 As the 
Register of Copyrights noted in regard to a previous, virtually identical bill 
(S. 791), the bills would have broadened the "subject matter coverage to all 
'original designs' which are intended to be 'attractive' or 'distinct.' ,,85 
These recent bills would have eliminated any requirement of attractiveness 
or aesthetics from the criteria for protection; as the Register said, "some of 
the parts mentioned, such as fuel injector nozzles, are internal engine parts 
never seen by the purchaser of the vehicle. "86 The Register noted that 
"[b]roadly construed, [the design rights legislation] could extend a ten-year 
exclusive right to an OEM's entire inventory of spare parts.,,87 Thus, the 
creation of a new industrial design right "will have a major impact on the 
way business is conducted in the United States. Potentially, millions of 
purely functional pistons and springs could be placed off-limits to competi-
tive pricing. ,,88 The consequences of such a change are so far reaching that 
Register Oman urges Congress to "make a thorough economic analysis of 
the impact of design protection having such a broad sweep. ,,89 
When the design rights legislation before the 10 I st Congress was intro-
duced earlier as S. 79] and H.R. 1179 in the IOOth Congress, there was con-
sideration of it on both the Senate and House sides. In the Senate, S. 791 
was introduced by Senators DeConcini and Hatch, respectively the Patents 
Subcommittee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member. 90 However, 
83. See 135 CONGo REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1989) (introduction of H.R. 902 by Rep. 
Moorhead); 135 CONGo REC. H4352-53 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (introduction of H.R. 
3017 by Rep. Gephardt); 135 CONGo REC. H7291 (daily ed. Oct. 19,1989) (introduction 
of ".R. 3499 by Rep. Moorhead). These bills are identical in relevant part to the indus-
trial design bill considered in the lOOth Congress discussed later in this Article. See 
infra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
84. Under the proposed bills, designs which are not subject to protection include those "dic-
tated solely by a utilitarian function" (emphasis added). H.R. 3017, IOlst Cong., 2d 
Sess. § -W02(d). This exception would exclude virtually no designs of useful articles. 
Cf Brown, Design Protection: An Overview. 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1355-57 (1987) 
(discussing current design patent standards) [hereinafter Brown, Design Protection). 
85. Senate Hearings. supra note 7, at 240. 
86. rd. at 240-41. 
87. rd. at 241. 
88. rd. 
89. Id. 
90. rd. at 1-8 (opening statements of Senators DeConcini and Hatch). 
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Senator Hatch flagged the potential anticompetitive impact of the bill on 
aftermarket parts.91 He said "[c]onsumers ought to continue to benefit 
from the extensive price competition that presently exists in the manufacture 
and sale of these crash parts" and Congress must be "careful not to preempt 
an area of marketplace competition and turn it int~ a monopoly. ,,92 
Hearings were held before the Senate subcommittee, with both auto 
manufacturers and insurers testifying;93 The bill was never brought to a 
vote before the subcommittee and it died at the end of the session. On the 
House side, the appropriate subcommittee 'of the Judiciary Committee held 
hearings on the industrial design bill (H.R. 1179) introduced by Represent-
ative Moorhead, but the bill did not make it past the subcommittee. 
In the 101st Congress, three virtually identical industrial design bills 
were introduced. Each would have provided for a radical departure from 
established intellectual property principles by creating a new design copy-
right, based on a "zero creativity" standard, for the design of functional 
articles. On May 3, 1990, the House subcommittee held a hearing on the 
legislation. Consumer and retail interests testified in strong opposition to 
the legislation.94 The House subcommittee held a second day of hearings 
on June 20, 1990. On the auto parts issue, the largest United States auto 
insurer, a major insurance association, auto parts manufacturers and retail-
ers, auto parts rebuilders, auto repair shops, and the auto glass aftermarket 
manufacturers testified in strong opposition to the legislation. On the other 
side, two United States auto manufacturers and the auto manufacturers' 
trade association testified in support of the legislation. In the 101st Con-
gress, the House subcommittee took no action on this legislat~on. 95 
91. [d. at.7. 
92. [d. 
93. Witnesses included Gary Newtson;Chief Patent Counsel, Chrysler Motors·Corp .• repre-
senting MVMA; Jean C. Hiestand. General Counsel. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.; and 
August Alegi. Vice President and Deputy General Counsel. GEICQ. representing the 
National Association of Independent Insurers. 
94. Witnesses in opposition included Clarence Ditlow. on behalf of the Center for Auto 
Safety and the Consumer Federation of America; Mark Silbergeld. on behalf ofConsuf"!l~ 
ers Union; and Rhonda Parish. on behalf of Wal-Mart Stores and the International Mass 
Retail Association. In support of the legislation. witnesses included' Rep. Gephardt. 
House Majority Leader; Rep. Michel. House Minority Leader; Robert Johnston. on 
behalf of the Industrial Design Coalition; Robert Drobeck. on behalf of the Industrial 
Designers Society of America; and William Thompson. on behalf of the American Intel-
lectual Property Law Association and the American Bar Association Section on Patent. 
Trademark .and Copyright Law. 
95. On June 20. 1990. witnesses in opposition to the legislation included C.A. Ingham. on 
behalf of State Farm Insurance Companies and the Coalition for Competitive Repair 
Parts; Claude Barfield. a trade policy expert; Roger Lawson. on behalf of the Alliance of 
American Insurers; Richard Thrney. on behalf of the Automotive Service Industry Asso-
ciation and the Automobile Parts Rebuilding Association; Julian Morris. on behalf of the 
Automotive Parts and Accessories Association; and Don Randall. on behalf of the Auto-
motive Service Association. In support of the legislation, the witnesses were William 
Cunningham. on behalf of the AFL-CIO; Kenneth Myers. on behalf of Ford Motor Com; 
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This new effort in the 10 1 st Congress, and now in the 102d Congress as 
well, to press once' again for industrial design legislation is being spear-
headed by the Industrial Design Coalition, which is comprised of more than 
thirty companies and trade associations pressing for enactment of industrial 
design legislation.96 In the legislative debate over industrial design legisla-
tion there are a number,of policy, economic, and legal questions that should 
be addressed if the bills are to encompass aftermarket parts. 
A. What Would Be the Cost to Consumers of a Return to Monopoly Status for 
the Auto Makers? 
First, crash parts prices would skyrocket. If newly found competition 
brought down the price of an Omni fender from $140 when it was a monop-
oly product to $76 when it faced competition, one can reasonably expect 
that, once the monopoly is available again, the price would 'shoot back to 
$140. The crash parts price index, which has been on a downward slope for 
a 'number of years with competition,97 will return to an upward climb and 
replicate the experience in the monopoly period of the 1970s. There simply 
can be no doubt that the immediate consequence of the reinstitution of a 
crash parts monopoly will be sharply increased parts prices. Why else 
would the auto manufacturers be pressing so strongly to eliminate the com-
petition? 
B. Will the Consumer Have any Choice in Determining What Kind of Crash 
Parts·He Wants to Place on His Car? 
If a person has a four-year-old car involved in a "fender bender," he will 
not have the choice to buy an aftermarket fender appropriate for his auto. 
He' will be forced to return to the manufacturer to buy its product at sharply 
inflated prices. Indeed, it was this concern that animated the House of 
Lords iIi the British Leyland case, which established an auto owner's "inher-
ent right to repair" so as "to have access to a free market in spare parts.,,98 
The Industrial Design Coalition has taken a contradictory and puzzling 
position on this issue. 99 It says that the "consumer should have the right to ' 
buy alternative replacement parts," but that that right should apply only to 
"repair and replacement parts (other than crash parts)."IOO 
The impact on consumer choice and the general lack of a significant 
public benefit led the United States Department of Justice to oppose the 
pany and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association; and David leMay, on behalf of 
Tecumseh Products Company and'the National Association of Manufacturers. 
96. SeeSeTIDleHearings, supra note 7, at·39 (testimony of William Thompson, representing 
the Industrial Design Coalition). 
97. See supra notes 17-20. 
98. British'Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., I App. Cas. 577. 578 (H.L. 
1986). 
99. SeTIDle Hearings, supra note 7, at 59. 
100. Id. at 58-59 (parenthetical in or-iginal; emphasis added); 
1989] .. Industrial Design and· Automobile Replacement Parts 253 
creation of a new industrial design. right in 1976 when Congress last seri-
ously cQnsidered this matter. 101 The Department of Justice then opposed 
the bill on the grounds that design legislation "would create a neW monopoly 
which has not been justified by showing that its benefits will outweigh the 
disadvantage of removing such designs from free public use.,,\o2 
Because the disruption that the present bill will impose on established 
competitive patterns is so significant and the scope of the bill is so broad, 
encompassing virtually every man-made article excep't wearing apparel and 
semiconductor chips, \03 the Register has urged Congress to approach this 
bill very cautiously and to commission a thorough economic analysis of the 
impact of design protection. 104 
C. Is Expanded Design Protection Essential to Foster Innovation? 
One must start with the proposition that current protections in the 
design field-design patents, copyright protection, and Lanham Act provi-
sions-appear to provide more than adequate protection and· incentive for 
the creators of American design. \05 That side of the debate has been sum-
marized by the Register of. Copyrights as follows: 
American ingenuity and creativity thrive under our existing intel-
lectual property laws balanced by opportunities to compete 
through imitation of unprotected designs. For seventy years, a 
few groups have agitated for design legislation on the ground that 
added incentives to create innovative designs are required. 
During this time, the American economy has flourished and has 
out-performed the economies of other countries. 106 
In the context of auto designs, all available evidence suggests that 
OEMs have ample existing design incentives; additional incentives, via 
industrial' design legislation, would be redundant and inefficient. For 
example, from 1985 through 1988, when significant aftermarket competi-
tion emerged, auto manufacturers reported impressive growth in research 
and development, sales and profits. Additionally, from 1980 through 1988 
the number of new auto models increased dramatically. 107 
Most importantly, auto manufacturers are driven by design incentives 
created· by the vigorously competitive new car market. Clearly, design 
investment is critical in the competition between domestic and foreign auto 
101; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94thCong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976). 
102. Id. at 50. 
103. Senate Hearings. supra note 7, at 215 (analysis of Register Oman). 
104. Id. at 241. 
105. ·Id. at 100-02 (testimony of Jean· C. Hiestand, Vice President and General Counsel, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance.Company). 
106. Id: at 233 (the Register was presenting the case against S. 791). 
107. BARFIELD REPORT, supra·note 6, at 10-11. 
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manufacturers to capture, maintain, or increase United States market 
shares. 
Even if an intellectual property case could be made for added indus-
trial design protection in the sale of the new automobile, that does not dem-
onstrate that it should be extended to .the replacement parts market, crash 
parts and otherwise. Replacement parts, whether OEM or not, are not sepa-
rately designed; indeed, they must be identical to the original parts. Thus, 
there are no added design costs or design efforts in connection with replace-
ment parts. One would not expect that a single additional penny would be 
expended by the car companies in the design of an automobile if crash parts 
were subject to new, expanded design rights. The MVMA has confirmed 
this: Even with aftermarket protection, "investment in the design and 
development of the exterior configuration of our vehicles would not neces-
sarily increase.,,108 Today, automobile companies spend significant dollar 
sums for design-but to create a car that is attractive competitively in the 
original sales market. 109 Killing aftermarket competition will not create 
any greater design incentives. General Motors will continue to spend a 
great deal of money to create new cars with an attractive overall design that 
will sell well in the competitive market against Ford, Honda, Chrysler, and 
other automobile manufacturers. That is the design incentive-to sell the 
car in the original market. There simply will be no added creativity if 
design rights apply to the repair market. 
Furthermore, based on the example of Ford Motor Company Limited, 
Ford's wholly-owned United Kingdom subsjdiary, research and development 
costs are not generally allocated by OEMs by vehicle, body part, or market 
(new or replacement); and. the pricing of replacement .parts is entirely unre-
lated to actual production costS. 11O On the first point, the United Kingdom 
Monopolies and Mergers (:ommission explained that: . 
No allocation of R&D [research and development] costs is 
specifically made to body parts or to vehicles. Therefore stan-
dard costs for body parts do not include any element of the costs 
of R&D, such costs being treated as part of general overheads. 
We were also told by Ford that it did not have a.policy whereby 
R&D costs, or any other costs, were included as specific elements 
108. Senate Hearings, supra no~e 7, at 82. 
109. MVMA claims, without any backup documentation, that the total design costs for a 
fender is $4.5 to $10 million. Id. There are no indications that those design expendi-
tures have decreased in the last few years with the advent of aftermarket competition 
and no evidence of allocation of these costs to the sale of this part in the replacement 
market. . . 
110. THE MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSIO,!" FORD MarOR CoMPANY LIMITED: A 
REPORT ON THE· POLICY AND PRACTICE OF TtfE FORD MOTOR CoMPANY LIMITED OF Nar 
GRANTING LICENSES TO MANUFACTURE OR SELL IN THE UNITED 'KINGDOM CERTAIN 
REPlJ\CEMENT PARTS FOR FORD'VEHICLES, (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1985) ai 
13, 19 [hereinafter MONOPOUES AND MERGERS CoMMISSION REPORT] .. 
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of the selling price calculated to recover such costs within a 
specific volume of sales or period of time. III 
255 
Second, Ford admitted that its pricing policy for replacement parts was gov-
erned by several factors which did not include costs. The factors were: 
Ford parts should be competitive with comparable OEM parts to parts in 
such countries; identical Ford parts should be priced comparably in differ-
ent countries; Fo'rd parts should be competitive with non-OEM competitive 
parts; and, lastly, Ford parts should contribute to overall profitability. I 12 
Additionally, Ford admitted that it could not allocate investment costs 
or profitability to replacement parts. 113 This evidence, un rebutted by 
OEMs testifying on this issue, completely undermines arguments that 
OEMs need industrial design protection to recoup R&D design costs. 
Last, the size of the replacement parts market is minuscule compared 
to the size of the new car market; OEMs have a two- to three-year lead time 
advantage over competitive suppliers; and independent suppliers face 
significant production costs and demand uncertainty. These are additional 
reasons why increased design protections for replacement parts would cre-
ate redundant design incentives. 
The failure to demonstrate that there is any intellectual property 
benefit at the margin fatally wounds the auto makers' case to extend design 
rights to the aftermarket, even if they were able to prevail on the proposition 
that the overall design of their cars should be protected against a competitor 
selling a replica of the car in the original market. Competition in the origi-
nal sales market conceivably could have an impact on the incentive to create 
more inventive and attractive designs, but creating a design right for crash 
parts clearly will not. 
D. Are New Intellectual Property Protections Essential to Auto Company 
Profitability ? 
As noted, the costs of designs are not insignificant. However, those 
design costs go to producing the design of the car to be sold in the original 
market. Even if it were possible to fully allocate costs to the replacement 
market, the allocated costs would be only a fraction of the total design 
costs. And certainly manufacturers must recover essentially all their 
design costs in the original sale of the car. 
It is, of course, likely that the recent, vigorous crash parts price compe-
tition may have squeezed some monopoly profits out of aftermarket sales. 
Auto companies have dropped aftermarket prices quite significantly. How-
ever, they still must be selling above costs. If they are not, and indeed are 
selling these parts below cost in an attempt to drive out competitors and 
Ill. Id. at 13. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 19. 
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regain their monopoly status, they would be creating a significant antitrust 
problem. One must presume that the auto companies would not be incur-
ring such risks in their pricing policy. 
In any event, the auto manufacturers' desire to make more money in a 
monopoly market, rather than less in a competitive market, is not itself a 
rationale for creating a new intellectual property right. As Representative 
Kastenmeier stated in identifying the appropriate political tests to deter-
mine whether a new intellectual property right should be created: 
the costs and benefits of the proposed [intellectual property] legis-
lation [must be presented]. . . . Since we live in a society of win-
ners and losers, the proponent must also candidly identify the 
groups that will bear the adverse consequences of the proposal 
and explain why they should bear those losses. The argument that 
a particular interest group will make more money and therefore 
be more creative does not ~atisfy this threshold standard or the 
constitutional requirements of the intellectual property clause. 114 
E. What About the Potential Economic Disruption for Established United 
States Manufacturers Who Today Are Creating and Selling Glass and 
Hard Parts in the Competitive Aftermarket? 
It is certain that the proposed bills would encompass dozens, and possi-
bly hundreds or thousands, of United States manufacturers who today make 
a wide variety of hard parts and glass for the competitive aftermarket. 
These companies could all be put out of business by a new industrial design 
bill. The auto manufacturers, however, have indicated that they may be 
willing to "exempt" windshields and other glass products, as well as "hard 
parts," from the scope of the design bills. 115 
But is there any principled basis, as a matter of intellectual property 
theory, to exclude those products from the law? Certainly they are included 
squarely within the bills' definitions. Windshields have a design shape in 
their contour and are integrated and graceful components of the overall 
design of the automobile. They have functional and safety qualities as well 
as design features. Their design is not dictated "solely" by functional con-
siderations and thus does not meet the criteria for the bills' exemption from 
design protection. Thus, their design components are completely analo-
gous to those of a fender or hood. 116 
114. Kastenmeier and Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A 
Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 441 (1985) [hereinafter The Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act) (footnote omitted). 
115. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 55; seealsoJLlne 1990 House Hearings, supra note 22, 
at 2 (unpublished testimony of Kenneth W. Myers, Marketing Manager, Parts and Ser-
vices Division, Ford Molor Company). 
116. The position of the Industrial Design Coalition to the contrary is simply wrong. [d. 
They claim, "[w)ithin the perimeter of [a windshield], automobile glass has no distinc-
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The only difference between glass and other aftermarket parts is an 
economic one-over the years, automobile companies have become accus-
tomed to dealing competitively with replacement glass in the competitive 
aftermarket; in contrast, only today are auto companies coming to grips 
with vigorous crash parts competition. The auto companies' unwillingness 
to compete, however, is not a rational basis to take the design of an item 
from the public domain and place it under the monopoly control of the man-
ufacturer. 
In sum, for years crash parts design rights have been almost univer-
sally in the public domain. There have been limited exceptions where auto 
manufacturers have sought design patent protection for individual parts. 
However, by and large, designs of individual parts have been available for 
the public to copy. The failure of a competitive aftermarket to develop all 
those years was much more a matter of practical economics, rather than a 
legal impediment. Only now, when a competitive market has developed, 
have the auto manufacturers attempted to withdraw these designs from the 
public domain and insure that they have a monopoly over these products. 
F. Would the Imposition of Design Rights on Replacement Parts Be 
Proconsumer? 
The Industrial Design Coalition claims that design legislation is pro-
consumer I 17 and will encourage new designs which "produce ... choices, 
not copies, for America's consumers." I 18 But as noted above, extending 
design rights to the aftermarket will not encourage new and better product 
design. Replacement parts will be the same design as original parts; 119 
there simply is no marginal benefit for the consumer to give the manufac-
turer monopoly design rights, thereby denying the consumer a choice to buy 
an inexpensive, competitive replacement part and forcing him to buy an 
expensive replacement part from the OEM. 
The major consumer groups vehemently oppose the proposed indus-
trial design rights legislation on the grounds that it is profoundly anti-
consumer. For example, in 1987 Consumers Union and the Consumer Fed-
eration of America opposed. the granting of design protections because of 
the "profound, negative effect on competition in manufactured goods indus-
tries [such that) ... the registrant [of a design right] would realize monop-
oly profits and consumers would. foot the bill.,,120 
tive shape." A look at contemporary windshields illustrates that this is not the case. 
117. Senate Hearings, supra note 7. at 58-59. 
118. 1988 House Hearings. supra note 55, at 83 (testimony· of Bruce Lehman on behalf of 
the Industrial Design Coalition). 
119. The Industrial Design Coalition concedes this. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 59. 
120. Letter from Mark Silbergeld, Director, Washington Office, Consumers Union and Gene 
Kimmelman, Legislative Director. Consumer Federation of America, to Sen. DeCon-
cini. Chairman, Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks (July 30, 
1987). Likewise, in the international trade context, Consumers Union recently reiter-
ated that it opposes the creation of industrial design rights in the United States based on 
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At the May 3, 1990 hearing before the House Subcommittee, Consum-
ers Union, the Consumer Federation of America, and the Center for Auto 
Safety urged the Subcommittee to reject the pending industrial design legis-
lation. Consumers Union testified that the legislation, if enacted, "could 
stifle existing competition in many consumer product markets.,,121 
Consumers Union testified that the legislation would serve "no public 
benefit" but instead "would serve the end of private profit maximization by 
penalizing useful imitation of ordinary objects, at the consumer's 
expense.,,122 Similarly, the Consumer Federation of America, the largest 
consumer interest group in the United States, and the Center for Auto 
Safety, an organization dedicated to protecting the economic and safety 
interests of consumers who purchase and drive automobiles, testified that 
the "proposed design rights bills are bad legislation, which will needlessly 
saddle the American consumer with higher prices and fewer product choices 
without justification." 123 
Furthermore, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
strongly opposed the industrial design rights legislation in 1987, as it 
applied to crash parts, out of its deeply held concerns for controlling the cost 
of automobile insurance. 124 Thus, consumer groups, and those committed 
to policyholders' interests, recognize unequivocally that industrial design 
legislation that applies to crash parts is anticompetitive and anticonsumer. 
Auto maQufacturers simply have no credible claims that industrial 
design rights resolution is proconsumer. Quite clearly, design rights legisla-
tion will benefit enormously, through supernormal monopoly profits, for-
eign and domestic auto manufacturers of replacement parts at the expense of 
United States consumers, automobile insurance policyholders and third-
party interests, such as insurance companies. 
G. Does the United States Lag Behind the World in the Area of Design Pro-
tection? 
There has been considerable emphasis placed on the fact that many for-
eign countries have separate industrial design laws, while the United States 
does not. 
the hundreds of millions of dollars of savings to consumers brought about by competi-
tion by independent manufacturers of replacement parts. Letter from Mark Silbergeld, 
Director, Washington Office, Consumers Union, to Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United 
States Trade Representative (September I, 1989). 
121. Hearings on H.R. 902. H.R. 3017. H.R. 3499. Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. Wist 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) (unpublished testimony of Mark Silbergeld, Director, Wash-
ington Office, Consumers Union). 
122. 1d. at 6. 
123. 1d. at 20 (unpublished testimony of Clarence Ditlow, Executive Director, Center for Auto 
Safety). 
124. Senate Hearings. supra note 7, at 131 (letter from Edward Muh1, President, NAIC, to 
Sen. DeConcini (Mar. 26, 1987». 
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That point, however, is only the beginning of the analysis. The Register of 
Copyrights has made it clear that the foreign design laws referred to by propo-
nents of design legislation provide no clear precedent for United States design 
protection. The Register notes that comparative analysis of foreign laws is dif-
ficult for a number of reasons. 'The various foreign industrial design laws tend 
to vary more than laws concerning other intellectual property, such as patents or 
trademarks."J25 Moreover, although some countries have a national "design 
registration system ... the [actual] registrability of a design is governed by 
internal administrative practices not readily apparent from a reading of the stat-
ute."J26 Further, the Register points out that the European laws are distinct and 
heterogeneous. The French rely more on their copyright law than on the French 
design statute, and the level of artistry and creativity required under the copy-
right law exceeds American copyright standards. The Italian design law 
involves a novelty test which is not as strict as that applied by the United States 
Patent Office, but well exceeds the virtually nonexistent standard in current 
United States industrial design bills. The Japanese law is quite different. It is 
often cited by proponents of United States industrial design legislation, but it 
provides in many instances design protection where copyright protection would 
be available in this country.127 As the Register states, "of the 30,000 designs 
registered annually in Japan, many cover items receiving copyright protection 
in the United States."J28 The Japanese law, in addition, requires a significantly 
higher level of creativity than the qualifying test under the United States indus-
trial design bill. 
Similarly, Professor Reichman has stated that many European Community 
laws 
tend to allow designers no novelty grace period in which to test-
market their output. Hence, those laws invalidate far more 
designs for lack of novelty than occurs under United States patent 
law, where a one-year grace period benefits designs in commerce. 
Moreover, the requirements of registration and deposit under for-
eign law, though less onerous than in the United States, remain 
too costly and burdensome for most foreign designers to make 
regular use of these laws. Finally, both the qualitative originality 
standard, and with some notable exceptions, the functionality 
standard that most foreign design laws impose in one form or 
another tend to exclude the bulk of the designs they are nominally 
supposed to protect. 129 
125. Id. at 235-36 (citation omitted). 
126. Id. a1236. 
127. See id. at 238. 
128. Id. 
129. See Industrial Design Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 902, H.R. 3017, H.R. 3499 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1990) (unpublished testi-
mony of IH. Reichman, Professor of Law, Vanderbill University, Sept., 1990). 
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Beyond the letter of law, the fact is that for years many auto crash parts have 
been widely available in Europe. 130 In some cases, no manufacturers bothered 
to secure and enforce industrial design protection; in other cases, as a practical 
matter, European laws simply are considered irrelevant to the crash parts prob-
lem. 131 Either alternative detracts from the argument that they are a model for 
United States legislation affecting crash parts competition. 
These issues are not settled in the European or international arenas. 
For example, as discussed above, in the United Kingdom the new copyright 
and design law effectively excludes crash parts from the scope of design pro-
tection. 132 Other countries have not directly confronted this issue and pro-
tect designs generally in a variety of ways, as discussed above. 
Thus, industrial design legislation abroad provides a varied picture; but 
even if a number of other countries have created industrial design protection, 
that does not answer the question of how to maximize public benefit through 
intellectual property laws and balance creativity and competition. 
Enacting an industrial design rights bill which would kill aftermarket com-
petition clearly does not serve the public interest. 
H. Is This Bill Necessary 10 Protect United States Jobs? 
Clearly, the intellectual property debate over design protection should 
not be the vehicle to try to formulate national trade policy. As described by 
Professor Ralph Brown, the industrial design bill "is a bald piece of protec-
tionism, aimed of course at the Japanese and other competitors in the 
replacement parts market." 133 This issue, however, is much more 
130. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 143. 
131. "(U]ntil 1981, in Great Britain, Ford simply chose 10 accept [aftermarket) competition in 
England 'by not asserting property rights against independent suppliers of replacement 
panels.'" Id. at 144 (citing MONOI'OUES AND MERGERS CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
(10). 
132. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 110. This Commission 
reached the following conclusions: 
(I) "Ford has chosen since 1981 to seek to carry on the body panel section of its 
business as a monopolist" /d. at 33. 
(2) This "course of conduct followed by Ford is anti-competitive" in its effect of 
preventing competition by independent replacement parts. Id. at 37. 
(3) "The competition of the independent" manufacturers reduced replacement 
parts' prices directly, by offering "a cheaper but equivalent (body] panel," and "led 
Ford to reduce the price of a (body) panel or to limit a price increase." Id. at 
37-38. 
(4) "Competition in the sale of new cars, in which the price of spares may play 
a small role, is therefore not an adequate substitute for competition in the sale 
of spare parts themselves." /d. at 39. 
(5) "[I)n the absence of competition, prices of replacement panels would be 
likely to rise. Elimination of the independents' competition is therefore 
against the public interest." Id. at 40. 
Ultimately, the Commission recommended a variety of changes in the United Kingdom 
intellectual property laws to preserve competition in the market for auto replacement 
parts. Id. at 46. 
133. Brown, Design Protection, supra note 84, at 1399. 
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complicated than simply the protection of United States jobs from foreign 
competition. For example, increasing numbers of crash parts are projected 
to be manufactured in the United States. Jobs entailed in producing such 
parts would be lost if the industrial design bill passes. 134 In addition, an 
entire importation, warehousing and distribution network for competitive 
parts has been established in the United States; these jobs would be lost. 135 
Virtually all replacement glass, which would be covered by the industrial 
design law,136 is manufactured in the United States; these jobs would be 
IOSt. 137 Competitive hard parts are manufactured and distributed in the 
United States; these jobs would all be lost. 138 Indeed, domestic auto com-
panies are rather cheeky to raise the issue of United States jobs when they 
have turned increasingly to foreign sources of manufacture for their auto-
mobiles, with massive loss of jobs in this country. 139 Most importantly, 
industrial design legislation would cost these United States jobs and, ironi-
cally, provide significant benefits to foreign auto makers. 140 
In 1988, almost forty percent of new cars sold in the United States were 
manufactured by foreign companies. Thus, roughly forty percent of the 
economic benefits of this proposed legislative monopoly-jobs and 
profits-would go directly to foreign companies. Further, growing foreign 
134. The Industrial Design Coalition has conceded that the design bill could not be limited 
to provide design protection against only foreign products. Senate Hearings. supra 
note 7, at 55·56. In fact, Caterpillar notes that 50% of parts competing with Caterpil-
. lar parts are made in the United States. Id. at 56. 
135. The number of United States workers in these activities is estimated at 3,300. Senate 
Hearings. supra note 7, at 117. 
136. Cf id. at 55 (view that glass would be excluded). 
137. It has been estimated that 20,000 jobs relating to the aftermarket glass industry might 
be lost by OEM monopolies in this area. See June 1990 House Hearings. supra note 22, 
at 2 (unpublished statement of Philip J. James, Chief Executive Officer, National Glass 
Association). 
138. If competition in crash parts is eliminated, State Farm's counsel suggested that a total 
of 21 ,400 United States jobs might be lost. Id. 
139. See generally Senate Hearings. supra note 7, at 171-72 (discussion between Sen. 
DeConcini and witnesses alluding to this phenomenon). 
140. Evidence that foreign auto manufacturers would take full advantage of broad industrial 
design legislation to monopolize the manufacture and sale of crash parts exists 
throughout their marketing and sales campaigns. For example, advertisements in 
trade journals display aggressive attempts by foreign manufacturers to maintain their 
hold on the aftermarket. See. e.g .• HAMMER & DOLLY, Sept. 1989, at II (publication 
for Washington, D.C. area repair shops) (advertisement stating that ''Toyota sheet metal 
can save you fits ... [bJecause there is nothing like the real thing. The same is hard to 
say for imitations."); HAMMER & DoLLY, Feb. 1989, at 6 (advertisement stating that 
"You have the right to demand proof that imitation parts equal the quality of Genuine 
Honda Body Parts."); HAMMER & DoLLY, Sept. 1989, at 15 (Subaru advertisement 
claiming that "[tlhe time it takes to read this headline is longer than the warranty on 
many imitation parts."); NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 1990, at 77 ("(fyour Toyota is ever in the 
body shop for collision repair, make sure you specify using only Genuine Toyota Sheet 
Metal . . . insurance appraisers often specify using imitation replacement parts. And 
that's just not good enough, since many imitation body parts simply do not meet 
Toyota's high quality standards .... "). 
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-
overstocking of parts by United States manufacturers, importation of whole 
product lines, and webs of marketing and arrangements between United 
States and foreign auto makers would shift abroad an even greater percent-
age of the monopoly profits at stake. 
The Register of Copyrights cogently asserts that the industrial design 
law is simply not a proper vehicle to make trade policy. He said in 1988 
House hearings: 
[T]he argument was often made that design protection would pre-
vent the marketing of foreign manufactured spare parts, perhaps 
of inferior quality in workmanship and materials. The Copyright 
Office believes that the quality of spare parts is a legitimate con-
gressional concern. Clearly, parts purchased by the American 
consumer should perform the function for which they were pur-
chased. The Copyright Office suggests, however, that product 
reliability concerns could be addressed in consumer products leg-
islation rather than design legislation. Design protection gives a 
manufacturer a right to exclude all competing copies-superior 
parts as well as inferior ones. Moreover, competing American 
firms are excluded from the field as well as foreign firms. And 
without the pressures of competition, the quality of the parts 
made by the original manufacturer could start to deteriorate. So 
design protection would be best evaluated on its own merits of 
advancing the public good by fostering the creation of new and val-
uable industrial designs rather than as a trade-inspired effort to 
protect a specific industry. 141 
Indeed, Register Oman points out that a design protection law could 
ultimately disadvantage United States manufacturers of crash parts vis-a-vis 
foreign OEMs: 
[in] light of the growing percentage of foreign-made automobiles 
in the United States[,] [w]e could be freezing United States manu-
facturers out of the potentially profitable parts market for this 
huge fleet of automobiles. As the dollar falls in relation to foreign 
currencies, we could again be extremely competitive in this mar-
ket. 142 
Thus, even as a matter of trade policy, design protection for crash parts is 
shortsighted and counterproductive. 
141. 1988 House Hearings, supra note 55, at 60 (statement of Ralph Oman, Regis1er of 
Copyrights) (emphasis added). 
142. 1d. 
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I. Potential Impact of GAIT Negotiations on Aftermarket Competition 
The Uruguay Round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tar-
. iffs and Trade (GATT) currently underway, but suspended temporarily, 
poses an enormously serious threat to crash parts competition in the United 
States. On April 8, 1989, preliminary negotiating texts on trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) were ratified in Geneva by the United 
States and other GATT Members. 143 These negotiating texts paved the way 
for the TRIPS negotiations within the Uruguay Round of GATT sessions. 
Some GATT member countries favor the inclusion of str:ong industrial 
design rights protection within a negotiated TRIPS agreement. Although it 
is clearly in the national interest to negotiate a comprehensive TRIPS agree-
ment embodying adequate and effective protections and enforcement mech-
anisms for United States-recognized intellectual property rights, such as 
copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets, such is not the case for 
broad industrial design rights not recognized by United States law. 
The United States negotiators should resist pressures from abroad to 
agree to industrial design right protections for three reasons. First, Con-
gress has refused steadfastly for three decades to create broad intellectual 
property protections for designs of manufactured articles. Recognizing 
this, the United States negotiators should not adopt or accept a position 
squarely inconsistent with United States policy and law. 
Second, as Register Oman pointed out in Congress, the creation of a 
new industrial design right could have a major impact on business in the 
United States. l44 Neither Congress nor proponents of the legislation have 
conducted a thorough economic study of the impact of sweepingly broad 
design protections. International obligations requiring the United States to 
create and enforce broad design rights could have severe and largely unde-
termined effects on the United States economy. 
Third, consistent with its constitutional mandate, Congress should 
determine the scope of any new industrial design protections. Most designs 
of industrial products and parts do not meet the traditional patent or copy-
right tests and have never been protectable under United States intellectual 
property laws. Congress should make the determination whether a radical 
143. Hearings on Oversight of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Before 
the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance. 101 st Cong .• 1st 
Sess. 2-10, 50-60 (testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Repre-
sentative, Apr. 20, 1989). See generally Results of the GA1T Ministerial Meeting Held in 
Punta del Este. Uruguay: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. 
on Ways and Means. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 12·15 (1986) (statement of Clayton Yeut-
ter); EC's Intellectual Propeny Proposal Debated in Uruguay Round Session. Daily 
Report for Executives (BNA) at A-9, col. I (July II, 1989). As of late 1990, GATT 
negotiations for industrial design rights were still under way. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
1368 (Sept. 12, 1990). 
144. See BARFIELD REPORT, supra note 6, at 52. 
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departure from existing United States law is necessary; the United States 
negotiators should not preempt that consideration. 
VI. RATIONALE FOR DRAWING THE LINE AT REPLACEMENT 
PARTS 
The insurance industry suggests that any new industrial design legisla-
tion considered by Congress should draw a principled distinction between 
the first sale of an overall article-such as an automobile-and the subse-
quent sale of replacement and repair parts necessary to maintain the overall 
article. Even if the proponents of increased design protection carry their 
burden of demonstrating the public benefits of sui generis protection gener-
ally for some realm of industrial designs, such protection should be limited 
to the first sale in a competitive market of an overall object embodying that 
design; it should not be extended to the aftermarkets for facsimile replace-
ment parts. In the context of the current legislation, the appropriate vehicle 
for this distinction is a "Consumer Right to Repair" amendment. 
Quite simply, this "Consumer Right to Repair'~ amendment would 
incorporate into any new industrial design law the principle, already 
embedded in our intellectual property traditions, that the owner of an 
object-even if that object is patented-enjoys the right to repair and main-
tain that object with parts of choice. This right to repair, as recognized in 
British Leyland, necessarily embraces the right to manufacture and supply 
competitive replacement parts. 145 
As a practical matter, the "Consumer Right to Repair" amendment 
would allow auto manufacturers to protect the designs of new automobiles 
and of parts within new automobiles (subject to the enumerated standards) 
sold as part of the new automobiles. In this respect, one auto manufacturer 
would be prohibited from copying the protected design of another auto 
manufacturer for use in a competing new auto or part of a new auto. How-
ever, no protection would attach to parts sold as replacement or repair parts 
for automobiles (unless such parts meet existing design patent or copyright 
standards). Thus, competition would be preserved in the markets for 
replacement shock absorbers, mufflers, batteries, fenders, windshields and 
hoods. 
The "Consumer Right to Repair" amendment reflects a principled 
approach to achieving balance in industrial design legislation based on long-
standing legal doctrines grounded in patent, copyright, antitrust and war-
ranty law. In traditional patent law, the rights owned by the holder of a pat-
ent are "exhausted" upon the first sale of the patented object. 146 The 
"exhaustion" of a patent holder's rights means that the purchaser of the pat-
ented object may enjoy the full use of the object without restrictions 
145. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
146. See Bloomer v. McQuewan. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852). 
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imposed by the patent owner. 147 In effect, the purchaser receives an 
implied license to use the object. In turn, the implied license to use an 
object entails a broad right to maintain and repair the patented article. 148 
The right to maintain and repair is limited by the principle that the 
owner of the object may replace damaged or worn (or even undamaged) 
parts, provided that the owner does not actually reconstruct the patented 
article. 149 The Supreme Court has stated that the replacement of parts, 
"whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts successively, is no 
more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property."ISO Further-
more, the Supreme Court embraced the principle that authorizing the pur-
chase of competitive replacement parts necessarily entails allowing the 
commercial and competitive supply of such parts. 151 
Like its counterpart "exhaustion" doctrine in patent law, the "first sale" 
doctrine ingrained in copyright law supports a principled distinction 
between the sale of a new product and the sale of replacement parts. The 
"first sale" doctrine, like the "exhaustion" doctrine, rests on the common 
law's hostility toward restraints on alienation of personal or real property, 
and allows the owner of a copyrighted article to use fully and resell the arti-
cle. IS2 Based on nineteenth century antecedents,153 early this century the 
Supreme Court clarified and Congress codified the "first sale" doctrine. 154 
The doctrine appears now in the 1976 Copyright Act in the following form: 
"the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this 
title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."155 
147. See Adams v. Burke, 84 US. (17 Wall.) 453. 456 (1873); see also United States v. 
Univis Lens Co .• 316 US. 241. 250 (1942) (patentee exhausts the monopoly in an arti-
cle once he sells it and he may not thereafter control the use or disposition of it). 
148. See Wilson v. Simpson, 50 US. (9 How.) 109. 123 (1850). 
149. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 US. 336,346 (1961). 
150. Jd. 
151. Jd. at 340-42. 346. 
152. A recent discussion of this doctrine is contained in Kastenmeier. Copyright in an Era of 
Technological Change: A Political Perspective, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (speech 
given at Columbia Law School on Mar. 30, 1989). Representative Kastenmeier 
explained that based on the first sale doctrine, "Congress should proceed cautiously in 
considering further inroads [in addition to the Record Rental Amendment Act] on the 
public's existing and well-considered privilege to redistribute legitimately acquired 
copies, once the copyright owner authorizes an initial sale." Jd. at 17. 
153. See Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689,690-91 (2d Cir. 1894); Stevens v. 
Gladding, 58 US. (17 How.) 447, 452 (1855); Stephens v. Cady, 55 US. (14 How.) 528 
(1853). 
154. In 1908, the Supreme Court declared clearly that: [D]ne who has sold a copyrighted 
article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it." Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US. 339, 350 (1908). The "first sale" doctrine was first 
codified in the 1909 Copyright Act. Act of Mar. 4, 19Q9. ch. 320, § 41. 35 Stat. 1075. 
1084. 
155. 17 US.c. § 109(a) (1988). Congress departed from this doctrine once; it did so to 
carve out a narrow exception regarding phonorecord rentals. 17 US.c. § 109(b) 
(1988) (Record Rental Amendment of 1983) (prohibiting the owners of records from 
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Congress has recognized that the "first sale" doctrine is deeply rooted in 
Anglo-American law lS6 and the Register of Copyrights regards as 
"[b]eyond cavil, [that] elements of the first sale doctrine represent funda-
mental principles of copyright law ... 157 
In addition to the intellectual property laws, antitrust law supports the 
need to draw a line in industrial design legislation between the initial sale of 
an auto and the sale of replacement parts for it. Federal antitrust law lS8 
prohibits certain tying arrangements lS9 on the ground that competition is 
thereby restrained by "deny[ing] competitors free access to the market for 
the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has 
a better product or a lower price but because of his power of leverage in 
another market."I60 
Tying arrangements are illegal per se if they involve (I) a tie-in 
between two separate and distinct products, (2) a seller with sufficient mar-
ket power in the tying product to coerce buyer acceptance of the tied prod-
uct, and (3) a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce in the tied 
product market. 161 In the absence of a per se violation, tying arrangements 
may be iIlegal as unreasonable restraints of trade under the rule of"reason 
analysis if actual anticompetitive effect is demonstrated. 162 
If auto manufacturers attempted to tie the sale of new autos with the 
sale of crash parts, clearly the first (two distinct products) and third (inter-
state commerce) prongs of the per se test would be met. The critical factor, 
then, would be the market shares associated with the auto manufacturers in 
the new car market. Although case law is not particularly instructive in 
defining precisely the relevant product and geographic markets for auto and 
renting records for commercial gain). The WIst Congress considered carving out a 
second exception for computer software rentals. 
156. H.R. REP. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2988,2989. 
157. Audio and Video Rental: Hearing on S. 32 and S. 33 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm .. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
25 (1983) (statement of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for 
Copyright Services, Library of Congress). 
158. The applicable federal laws are section I of the Sherman Act, section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1, 14,45(a)(1) 
(1988). 
159. A tying arrangement is the sale of one item, the tying product, on the condition that the 
purchaser obtain a second item, the tied product, from the same source. See Northern 
Pac. Ry. CO. V. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5-6 (1958). 
160. [d. at 6; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde. 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). 
161. See, e.g., Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 814 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 955 (1988); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. (987). cerro denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Tic-X-
Press, Inc. V. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407,1414 (lith Cir. (987). Courts have 
recognized a business justification defense to otherwise illegal tying arrangements. 
See, e.g., Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1348-49. 
162. See Arney, Inc. V. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1503 (lIth Cir. 1985), 
cerr. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986). 
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light trucks, there is powerful evidence that certain domestic auto 
makers-no matter how the market is defined-possess sufficient market 
power in the tying product market (autos) that a tie-in between the sale of 
cars and the sale of crash parts would raise serious antitrust concerns. 
Similarly, when evaluated as a possible unreasonable restraint on trade, 
it is highly likely that tying arrangements by auto manufacturers would 
impede competition to the extent that actual anticompetitive effects 163 could 
trigger antitrust liability. Thus, under either approach, tying arrangements 
by auto manufacturers, even if they were achievable as a practical matter, 164 
likely would run afoul of longstanding antitrust doctrine. Recognizing that 
certain auto manufacturers currently cannot create tying arrangements 
between autos and crash parts without serious antitrust implications and tre-
mendous practical obstacles, Congress should resist allowing all OEMs to 
use industrial design legislation to eliminate competition for replacement 
and repair parts. The' "Consumer Right to Repair" amendment, on the 
other hand, would "untie" the sale of autos from the sale of replacement and 
repair parts. 
The industrial design legislation subverts the goals of federal warranty 
law. Federal law explicitly preserves consumer access to a competitive mar-
ket in repair parts and services. Specifically, the Magnuson-Moss Federal 
Trade ·Commission Improvement Act expressly bars sellers from condition-
ing warranties on the purchase of specific parts or services. 165 Even when 
the manufacturer provides a warranty for the product, this federal law bars 
it from requiring consumers to purchase repair or replacement parts solely 
from it. 
The 'industrial design legislation would permit OEMs to require con-
sumers to purchase repair parts from them, contrary to federal warranty law 
and policy. The "Consumer Right to Repair" amendment, in contrast, is 
163. These effects could be creating barriers to entry of new competitors in the tied product 
market, facilitating price discrimination or impairing the consumer's ability to evaluate 
the true cost of each of the products when they are available only as a package. See Jef-
ferson Parish, 466 US. at 14-15. If consumers are prohibited from purchasing lower 
priced or higher quality products in the tied products market due to the tying arrange-
ment, then an actual anticompetitive impact is proven. Id. at 30. 
164. Even if auto manufacturers did not face antitrust concerns in creating tying arrange-
ments for crash parts, they would be tied with enormous practical difficulties in creat-
ing appropriate contractual. and warranty arrangements and enforcing them. 
165. Section 102(c) of this Act provides: 
No warrantor of a consumer product may condition his written or implied war-
ranty of such product on the consumer's using, in connection with such product, any 
article or service (other than article or service provided without charge under the terms 
of the warranty) which is identified by brand, trade, or corporate name; except that the 
prohibition of this subsection may be waived by the Commission if-(I) the warrantor 
satisfies the Commission that the warranted product will function properly only if the 
article or service so identified is used in connection with the warranted product, and (2) 
the Commission finds that.such a waiver is in the public interest. 
15 US.c. § 2302(c) (1988). 
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consistent with the goal of federal warranty law; both are designed to pre-
serve consumer access to a competitive repair market. 
Representative Kastenmeier, the long-time Chairman of the House sub-
committee with jurisdiction over intellectual property issues, had explained 
that Congress ought to apply certain tests before adopting any new intellec-
tual property legislation. l66 One of these tests is that "the proponent of a 
new interest ought to show that the interest can fit harmoniously within the 
existing legal framework without violating existing principles or basic con-
cepts."167 The industrial design legislation fails this fundamental test. 
First, the legislation violates existing principles and basic concepts by 
completely abolishing the design patent standards for novelty, ornamentality 
and nonobviousness and the copyright standard for separability. Second, 
the industrial design legislation violates the existing principles and basic 
concepts of "exhaustion" under patent law, of the "first sale" doctrine in 
copyright law, of tying prohibitions under antitrust law and of warranty pro-
scriptions under federal trade law. The "Consumer Right to Repair" 
amendment, in contrast, embraces these legal doctrines in drawing the line 
between protectable designs of overall new products and unprotectable 
designs of replacement and repair parts sold as such. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The basic issue in considering the application of the industrial design 
bill to the aftermarket industry is whether any case at all exists for disturb-
ing the public domain and the vigorous competition in replacement parts 
which has afforded consumers such significant benefits. No real foundation 
has been laid-legally, economically, or equitably-to extend auto manu-
facturers' rights beyond the existing standards of the design patent laws. 168 
State counterfeiting and palming off statutes adequately protect consumers 
against deceptive marketing practices. Independent testing helps assure the 
quality of both OEM and non-OEM parts. Finally, consumer information 
laws will ensure that the ultimate purchaser of repair parts is knowledgeable 
about the subject. 
The congeries of federal and state statutory protections are quite 
sufficient to draw an appropriate balance between creativity and 
·166. See The Semiconduclor Chip Proleclion AC1, supra note 114, at 438-44. 
167. Id. at 440; see also Kastenmeier, supra note 152, at 23 (stating that "[p)roponents of 
new copyright interests must show that their proposed changes will fit harmoniously 
within the existing legal framework without degrading or diluting existing principles 
and concepts"). 
168. The justification for excluding crash parts from the reach of the bill is clearly firmly 
grounded, unlike the origin of the decision to exempt clothing. It is reported that in the 
1950s House Speaker McCormack said he could "get your bill passed for you if you'll 
except the ladies undergarment manufacturers in New England because that's where I come 
from." SeTlLlle Hearings, supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Judge Rich, representing the 
National Council of Patent Law Associations) (that exemption continues in the present bills). 
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competition; the utter jack of any justification for change, beyond the auto 
companies' hope for the economic exploitation of a monopoly, leads one 
inexorably to the conclusion that replacement parts should be excluded from 
any new industrial design protection. 
Certainly, the general debate over design legislation will continue to be 
lively. If Congress determines that it wants to enact such added design pro-
tections, it should exclude across-the-board the replacement and repair mar-
ket-not just automobile parts but other repair parts as well. That would be 
consistent with appropriate legal, intellectual property, and economic con-
siderations. 
First, excluding replacement parts and permitting a competitive market 
to continue to flourish are consistent with the right of a buyer to do what he 
wants with his product. He bought his car or other product in a competitive 
market; when it comes time to repair it, the law should not push that buyer 
back to a monopoly market to buy a replacement or repair part. A buyer 
should have the right to repair his product in any way he wants. 
This principle is, of course, consistent with the British Leyland deci-
sion, which established an auto owner's inherent right to repair. That out-
come seems to have been codified in the new British Copyright Law. It is 
also consistent with the well-established "exhaustion" and ~'first sale" doc-
trines and federal antitrust and warranty laws. 
Second, as a matter of intellectual property principles, proponents have 
no credible claim or evidence that providing an industrial design monopoly 
over aftermarket parts will increase the quantum, or the quality, of creativ-
ity in the development of the overall design of the product. Manufacturers 
design a product for its original sale. There simply will be no added crea-
tive effort directed solely to the design for the replacement parts market. 
Thus, an auto manufacturer has all the intellectual property incentive it 
needs in designing an attractive car for original sale. 
Third, as an economic maUer, it is beUer policy to require that an auto 
company attempt to recover its costs in a competitive market rather than in a 
monopoly market. The elimination of monopoly power in the aftermarket 
has no doubt increased pressures on auto companies to raise prices on their 
original models. But auto companies compete in the sale of new cars. Soci-
ety will get the most efficient results, with the lowest prices, when auto com-
pany profits have to be realized in the competitive marketplace. Societal 
interests clearly are not optimized when a significant portion of a manufac-
turer's profits are realized pursuant to monopoly power in a sheltered mar-
ket. 
The industrial design debate is likely the last major opportunity for auto 
manufacturers to kill, in a single stroke, aftermarket competition and regain 
their monopoly hold on crash parts. The stakes are simply too great for con-
sumers and competition to let that happen. Possibly, free competition 
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in the marketplace will ultimately reject competitive crash parts. But unless 
. that happens, there is no basis-in terms of economic~ or intellectual prop-
erty law-for Congress to intervene and destroy that competition. 
